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Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953) 2 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES E. WISE, 
Appellant, 
- v -
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
11051 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, James E. Wise, appeals from an 
order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
By order dated September 29, 1967, the trial 
court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, dis-
missed appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the trial court's order 
dismissing appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 9, 1963, in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., pre-
siding, appellant was convicted on trial by jury un-
der Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 ( 1953) of the crime of 
issuing a check against insufficient funds and was 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeter-
minate term provided by law. 
At the hearing on appellant's complaint and 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus held on Sep-
tember 5th and 18th, 1967, Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson presiding, appellant testified that two days 
before his trial was to be held, on October 7, 1963, 
he received by mail service of notice of withdrawal 
of counsel from his attorney, Mr. James F. Housley 
(T. 12). Immediately thereafter, according to his testi-
mony, appellant went to the chambers of Judge Ray 
Van Cott, Jr., and requested of that judge a contin-
uance of his trial so that he might retain other 
counsel. According to the testimony of appellant, 
that request was denied (T. 13). According to his testi-
mony, appellant then said: "Well, may I at least de-
fend myself so that there \A.till be some sort of de-
fense?" Judge Van Cott replied, no, that he would 
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refuse to let Mr. Housley withdraw (T. 14). It was 
not shown that there was a reporter present, and if 
this conversation did indeed take place it was not 
made part of the record. The only evidence to the 
fact that it did take place, or to the substance of it, 
came from the testimony of appellant (T. 13) and a 
woman companion, Mrs. Greta Butterfield, appel-
lant's girl friend (T. 28). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS HERE PRESENTED DO NOT 
REVEAL A SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF DUE 
PROCESS AND ARE DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM THIS COURT'S HOLDING THAT A 
FAILURE TO PERMIT A DEFENDANT TO 
REPRESENT HIMSELF CONSTITUTES RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR. 
In the hearing on appellant's petition for habeas 
corpus, and in this appeal appellant relies heavily 
on this court's opinion in State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 
2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954), where it was held that 
refusal to allow a defendant to represent himself 
constituted reversible error. That case is distinguish-
able from the present case on appeal both factually 
and in its rationale. 
In State v. Penderville. supra. the defendant, by 
letter to the trial court on the day before the trial, 
complained of the service being rendered him by 
his attorney and requested a postponement to en-
able him to procure other counsel. The court had 
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Penderville brought before it where he repeated his 
request for a postponement in the presence of a re-
porter. the conversation being made a part of the 
record. The request for postponement was denied. 
This court held this denial was not error as there 
had been no showing that the attorney was unfaith-
ful, incompetent, or unprepared for trial. Penderville 
then asked to defend himself rather than proceed 
with counsel in whom he had lost confidence. This 
was denied, and trial was held with representation 
by the original counsel. This court held, granting 
a new trial: "The right to defend in person certain-
ly should not be denied an accused in a situation 
where he must either choose to use it or proceed 
with counsel in whom he has lost confidence." (2 
Utah 2d at 288). 
In the present case, appellant was represented 
by Mr. Housley at the preliminary hearing and 
made no attempt to discharge him at that time (T. 16), 
or in the intervening four to six weeks (T. 25), be-
tween the time of the preliminary hearing and the 
date at which Mr. Housley attempted to withdraw 
as counsel. He had made no move to discharge Mr. 
Housley when, two days before trial, he received 
the notice of withdrawal. Respondent submits this 
supports a fair inference that appellant fully intend-
ed to go to trial with Mr. Housley representing him 
and had confidence in that attorney's ability to pro-
vide him an adequate defense. 
Therefore. the trial court's refusal to allow Mr. 
Housley to withdraw would work no prejudice to 
5 
appellant under the rationale of State v. Penderville, 
supra. As in Penderville. appellant initiated the at-
tempt to change counsel and had expressed a re-
luctance to go to trial with his original counsel, say-
ing that he would rather defend himself than be 
represented by that attorney. Respondent submits 
that appellant's testimony as to what he said in the 
conversation with Judge Van Cott supports a fair in-
ference that his primary concern was not defending 
himself but in insuring" ... some sort of defense ... " 
(T. 14). and that he obviously felt, as witnessed by 
that statement, that Mr. Housley's withdrawal and 
Judge Van Cott's refusal to grant a continuance 
would force him to trial without a defense. The sub-
sequent refusal by Judge Van Cott to allow Mr. 
Housley' s withdrawal would seem to have alleviated 
that fear, and respondent suggests that knowledge 
of the Penderville holding may account for the em-
phasis in the appellant's account of the conversation 
with Judge Van Cott on his purported desire to de-
fend himself. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DIS-
MISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY HOLDING AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE COMPLAINT 
APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO RAISE WAS 
NOT REACHABLE BY A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS, BEING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF 
THAT WRIT. 
In Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 
(1944), this court, on rehearing, held that the scope 
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of habeas corpus was limited to the correction of 
jurisdictional errors and the determination of wheth-
er or not a petitioner had been deprived of consti-
tutional rights, and that with the exception of these 
two areas, errors of the trial court must be corrected 
by appeal. 
Appellant makes no contention that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction, therefore, his petition must 
demonstrate denial of constitutional rights to come 
within the scope of the writ. This court in Bryant v. 
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 284, 4~1 P.2d 121 (1967) defined 
the function of the extraordinary writ of habeas 
corpus in stating: 
We do not mean to sav that the time honored writ 
of habeas corpus does' not have a very important 
and useful purpose in our law. But that purpose is 
not to review a final judgment arrived at through 
regular proceedings and due process of law by a 
court having jurisdiction. The writ is, as our rules 
describe it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to pro-
tect one who is restrained of his liberty where there 
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the 
requirements of the law have been so ignored or 
distorted that the party is substantially and effec-
tively denied what is included in the term due pro-
cess of law, or where some other such circumstance 
exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to 
re-examine the conviction. (431 P.2d at 122, 123) 
The burden of showing error or prejudice is 
on the appellant who seeks to upset the conviction. 
State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966), 
and he must show such grounds by evidence that 
is clear and convincing. McGuffey v. Turner, 18 
Utah 2d 354 423 P.~d 166 (l 967). Appellant made no 
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contention that any prejudice resulted to him. The 
fact that no prejudice resulted from an alleged de-
nial of constitutional rights has been held to justify 
dismissal or denial of habeas corpus petitions based 
on alleged denials of constitutional rights. Gallegos 
v. Cox. 341 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1965); Armstrong v. 
Bannan. 272 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Has-
kins. 2 Ohio 2d 324, '.?.08 N.W.2d 742 (1965). 
Appellant makes no claim that he was not rep-
resented adequately. The attorney who defended 
him was prepared for trial (T. 24). Respondent sub-
mits that it cannct be said that appellant was sub-
stantially or effectively denied due process of law 
or that any prejudice resulted to him. 
It has been stated: 
If the trial court had jurisdiction, it is only in extra-
ordinary cases, where the circumstances surround-
ing the trial make it a sham and a pretense, that 
the writ will lie on the ground for want of due proc-
ess of law even though it be alleged that the accused 
has been denied rights guaranted by the Constitu-
tion. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d. 748 (C.C.A. Ga. 
1937), cert. granted 303 U.S. 629, 58 Sup.Ct. 610, 
82 L.Ed. 1089, rev. on other grounds 304 U.S. 458, 
58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; See also, State 
ex rel Dunlap v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 287 N.W. 
229 (1939). 
The respondent submits that the writ is discre-
tionary and that unless it appears that the judge be-
low clearly abused his discretion, that decision 
should not be overturned. State v. Crank. et al. 105 
Utah 322, 142 P.2d 178 (1943). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's reliance on the Penderville case fails 
to take into account the factual distinctions between 
that decision and the instant case. The trial judge 
here correctly required counsel to proceed to trial 
in the matter. To do otherwise would have been to 
give substance to appellant's self-expressed fear of 
his inability to defend himself. 
Further, this case represents another attempt 
by an appellant to take a belated appeal. The court 
below correctly found the issue presented not justi-
ciable through habeas corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
